This paper considers a model of legislative decision-making, in which information must be collected from a strategic lobbyist. The legislature appoints a committee to communicate with the lobbyist and propose a bill, and the legislature commits to whether the proposal is processed under open or closed rule. Consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the legislature to appoint a biased committee, and both open and closed rules are used in equilibrium, depending on the lobbyist's bias.
Introduction
There are many aspects of legislative decision-making that, despite being discussed at length in the political science literature, are still not completely understood by scholarly research. One such question is why legislative bodies sometimes tie their own hands and give power to specialized committees, by granting restrictive rules to amending proposals, thereby giving committees agenda-setting power. Another open question is why many committees consist of preference outliers (members whose preferences are strongly biased, relative to the median legislator). 1 Given that committees are granted some power, why would the legislature ever appoint preference outliers?
Motivated by these questions, we analyze a model involving both procedural rule selection and committee selection, in the tradition of informational theories of legislative committees, started by the seminal paper of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987; hereafter GK) . 2 Our analysis builds on recent developments in the game theoretic literature of intermediated communication and delegation (Dessein (2002) , Ivanov (2010) , and Ambrus, Azevedo and Kamada (2012; hereafter AAK) ). In particular, we assume that initially an outside interest group (lobbyist) has information that is relevant to the legislature for a new piece of legislation.
The lobbyist is a strategic actor whose preferences are biased relative to the legislature. The legislature can appoint a committee, with preferences possibly differing from the legislature, to act as an information intermediary between the lobbyist and the legislature. More concretely, the committee communicates to the lobbyist and then makes a proposal to the legislature. Besides selecting the committee, we also assume that the legislature can ex ante choose whether to process the ensuing legislation through open rule or closed rule. 3 Under open rule the legislature retains the right to decide on the legislation that ultimately becomes law (for ease of exposition from hereafter we will say choose the action), and the committee's proposal only represents cheap talk from the committee to the legislature. Under closed rule, the legislature essentially delegates the right to choose an action to the committee. We are interested in the optimal committee and 1 There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which committees are biased. However, most scholars agree that at least some committees consist of preference outliers, and some argue that this is a feature of most committees. Ray (1980) , Weingast and Marshall (1988) and Dion and Huber (1996) present results indicating that many or most committees are outliers, while Krehbiel (1990 Krehbiel ( , 1991 and Cox and McCubbins (1993) find that there is no convincing evidence that committees systematically consist of preference outliers. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find a dramatic shift toward less representative committee contingents among democrative representatives after the 83rd House, concentrated on four committees: Agriculture, Armed Services, Veterans' Affairs, and Education and Labor.
2 Other theories of legislative committees include: (i) the distributive benefits theory, which argues that the power granted to committees is private benefit (pork) to the corresponding members of the legislature; (ii) the majority-party cartel theory, which argues that committees help the ruling party achieve its goals; and (iii) the bicameral rivalry theory, according to which committees serve as hurdles in the legislative procedure that help legislators extract more rents from lobbyists. For a survey paper on the topic, see Groseclose and King (2001) . 3 We follow GK in assuming that the legislature can ex ante commit to a procedural rule. In practice, the Rules Committee decides what procedural rule to use after the committee submitted the proposal. However, as GK discusses, given that the Rules Committee makes procedural decisions repeatedly with high frequency, reputational concerns are thought to make it possible for the Rules Committee to act according to a precommitted rule of behavior that is ex ante optimal for the legislature. GK points out that this is also consistent with empirical evidence on the composition and decisions of the Rules Committee (see also Groseclose and King (2001) ). procedural rule chosen by the legislature, as a function of the lobbyist bias. 4
Our main findings are as follows. If the bias of the lobbyist is small then it is optimal for the legislature to appoint a committee whose preferences are perfectly aligned with the lobbyist, and grant closed rule.
For intermediate levels of lobbyist bias, it remains optimal for the legislature to grant closed rule, but with a committee whose preferences are only partially aligned with the lobbyist, in the sense of being strictly between the preferences of the legislature and of the lobbyist. Finally, when the lobbyist's bias is large enough, it is optimal for the legislature to choose open rule and a committee that is biased in the opposite direction of the lobbyist. 5 Hence, our model can account for why the legislature wants to form biased committees, and also why for some bills are passed under closed rule while others are passed under open rule.
Our results shed light on the mixed empirical findings on the relationship between committee bias and whether open or closed rule is used. In a series of papers, Huber (1996, 1997) and Krehbiel (1997a,b) offer mixed evidence, sometimes finding a positive, sometimes negative, and sometimes insignificant effect of the magnitude of committee bias on rule selection. 6 This is consistent with our finding that there is no simple relationship between the magnitude of committee bias and the chosen procedural rule. The optimality of either closed or open rule is compatible with either small or large committee bias.
One simple prediction of our model is that the optimal committee is never more biased in absolute terms than the lobbyist. Moreover, the committee is strictly less biased unless the lobbyist's bias is small. This is consistent with Poole and Rosenthals (1997) finding that lobbyists tend to be more extreme advocates of policy issues than committee members.
The intuition behind the main results can be summarized as follows. For small biases, the loss of the legislature from delegating the decision right is second-order, relative the loss caused by strategic communication, as pointed out in Dessein (2002) . 7 For this reason it is optimal to fully delegate the decision to the 4 An alternative modeling approach would be assuming that acquiring information requires effort on the part of committee members. Both Gerardi and Yariv (2008) and Che and Kartik (2009) point out that in settings with costly information acquisition, bias can increase incentives to gather information. In our model there are no information acquisition costs, instead we focus on the strategic aspects of acquiring information. Nevertheless, the resulting trade-offs are similar: the committee being better informed but more biased. The above papers do not investigate the interplay between open vs. closed rule (cheap talk vs. delegation) and the bias of the committee (agent). Hence, it is an open question whether a model of costly information acquisition could provide a theory of committee bias and amendment rules that is in line with the empirical observations. 5 These findings are at odds with those in Li (2007) , which is the first paper we are aware of that introduces a strategic outside expert into the legislative decision-making framework. Li (2007) only analyzes the case of open rule, and only considers pure strategy equilibria. As a consequence, he finds that committees cannot facilitate better information trasmission, and hence the assumption of strategic outside experts does not lead to a theory of committees. As opposed to this, we show that committees can enhance information transmission both in the case of closed and open rules (in the latter case when one allows for mixed strategies).
6 Both Dion and Huber and Krehbiel have examined the effect of committee bias on use of restrictive rules, using data from the 94-98th congress. They report results for different econometric specifications, subsamples and controls. The results are inconclusive, and extremely sensitive to the specification. For example, Dion and Huber find a significant negative coefficient in one of their specifications, and in other specifications both positive and negative insignificant coefficients. Krehbiel finds a large, positive, and significant coefficient in one specification, but negative insignificant coefficients in others. The point estimates are also very different in different specifications.
7 Kydd (2003) makes the counterpart of this point in the context of mediating conflict resolution: he claims that a party lobbyist. For intermediate biases, there is a nontrivial trade off between decreasing the committee's bias and decreasing the loss arising from strategic communication between the committee and the lobbyist. Lastly, for large biases, delegating the decision to a committee yields few benefits, as informative communication between the committee and the lobbyist would require an overly biased committee. However, intermediated cheap talk can have substantially in these cases (pointed out first by Ivanov (2010)), implying that open rule becomes optimal. And for large biases the optimal intermediary is biased in the opposite direction of the lobbyist, as such an intermediary can ease the incentive constraints of the lobbyist to reveal information.
For example, a negatively biased budget committee can offset the bias of a positively biased interest group, by sometimes proposing a low budget even when the interest group's original request was high. This induces the legislature to allocate a relatively high budget even after low proposals from the committee, reducing the gap between how much money the legislature allocates when receiving a high versus low proposal from the committee. But this makes a relatively low budget request more attractive for the interest group when their budget need is indeed low.
The central assumption in our model, namely that originally it is interest groups that possess the relevant information necessary for the new legislature, is in line with how most scholars think about the legislative procedure and the role of lobbyists (see for example Rothenberg (1989) and Hansen (1991) ). 8 In fact, in a typical situation, the first drafts of new bills tend to be written by interest groups, before the relevant committee reworks it as a proposal. Lowi et al. (2010) summarize this point in the following way:
"Interest groups also have substantial influence in setting the legislative agenda and in helping craft specific language in legislation. Today, sophisticated lobbyists win influence by providing information about policies to busy members of Congress. As one lobbyist noted, "You can't get access without knowledge... I can go in to see [former Energy and Commerce Committee chair] John Dingell, but if I have nothing to offer or nothing to say, he's not going to want to see me." (p. 531)
Our model connects two strands of literatures, informational theories of interest groups, and informational theories of legislative committees. The former strand of literature, surveyed in Austen-Smith (1997), abstracted away from the role of committees in the legislative process. Informational theories of committees, starting with GK, emphasize the role of committees in gathering specialized information and transmitting involved in the conflict is more likely to believe a piece of information from a mediator if the latter is "on his side." As opposed to this, in our model, in case of closed rule, what matters is how close the committee's interests to the lobbyist (the original source of information) are, not how close they are to the legislature (the ultimate recipient). Clearly, the important difference between our model and Kydd's is that in the latter the information transmission from the original source of information to the mediator is unmodeled. 8 An alternative view is that interest groups influence legislation directly by offering monetary contributions in exchange for policy outcomes they favor, reflected for example in Snyder (1991) , Diermeier and Myerson (1999) , and Helpman (1999, 2001) . Austen-Smith (1993a) offers a model in which monetary contributions grant interest groups access to politicians with limited time, but they do not directly influence policy decisions. For a survey covering both strands of the literature, see Austen-Smith (1997). it to the legislative body, but they do not model the gathering of information as interaction with a strategic lobbyist, and instead focus on the information exchange between a committee and the legislature. Using the communication model of Crawford and Sobel (1982; hereafter CS) , GK point out that if a committee's preferences differ from the median legislator, it does not want to truthfully transmit all information to the legislature. This can provide a rationale for closed rule, since it commits the legislature to accept proposals that are biased towards the committee's preferences, inducing the committee to reveal more information. However, the model of GK does not explain why committees sometimes consist of preference outliers. If the committee and the legislature share the same preferences, strategic information transmission would not be an issue, invalidating the argument for the use of closed rule. 9
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formally describes the model. In Section 3 we derive and discuss our main results. Section 4 considers two extensions of the main model. In the first extension we assume that the bias of the committee is exogenous, and the legislature can only choose the procedural rule.
In the second extension we suppose the legislature can endogenously determine a status quo action in case of closed rule. Section 5 concludes.
Model
We consider a multi-stage game of legislative decision-making with three players: a lobbyist, a committee and the legislature. The outcome of the game is a policy action x ∈ R. The players' preferences over available policy actions depend on an ex ante unknown state of the world θ ∈ [0, 1].
The respective payoffs of the legislature, the committee, and the lobbyist are given by −l(
We assume that l attains its minimum at l(0) = 0. Following standard terminology, we refer to l as the loss function. Note that given θ, the legislature's optimal policy is θ, while the optimal policies of the lobbyist and the committee are given by θ + b L and θ + b C . We refer to b L and b C as the biases of the lobbyist and the committee. Without loss of generality we assume b L ≥ 0 (the case of a negatively biased lobbyist is perfectly symmetric).
Throughout the main text we restrict attention to the case when θ ∼ U ([0, 1]) and l(y) = y 2 (this specification is introduced by CS and often referred to as the uniform-quadratic specification). In a supplementary appendix we investigate how the qualitative conclusions we derive extend to more general specifications.
We assume that the distribution of the state and the preferences of players are common knowledge.
The game starts with an ex ante stage (stage 0), in which the legislature selects b C and the procedural rule, which can be either open or closed. 10
After the ex ante stage, the choices of the legislature become commonly known.
In stage 1, the lobbyist observes the realization of θ, and sends a private message m ∈ R to the committee. This message does not directly influence the payoffs and does not change the available actions of players at later stages of the game. Hence, communication between the lobbyist and the committee is assumed to be cheap talk. In real life the message can correspond to a draft proposal written by the lobbyist.
In stage 2 the committee sends a proposal (bill) p ∈ R to the legislature. The solution concept we use throughout the paper is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as defined in AAK. 11 From now on we simply refer to it as equilibrium. Moreover, following GK and Krishna and Morgan (2001) , we assume that in any subgame following the legislature's stage 0 choices, the equilibrium most preferred by the legislature prevails.
For analytical convenience, we assume that the status quo policy is so bad that irrespective of the realized state, the legislature always accepts the committee's proposal in case of closed rule. A sufficient condition
3 Optimal committee and rule selection
The following is the main theorem of this paper. Let b = 1/6 andb = 2+ √ 3/2 10 . Theorem 1. The optimal choices of the legislature are given by:
• For b L ≤ b, using closed rule and a committee with interests fully aligned with the lobbyist:
• For b < b L <b, using closed rule and a committee with interests strictly between the lobbyist and the
• Forb < b L < 1/2, using open rule and a committee with interests opposite to the lobbyist's:
In either case, no information is transmitted to the legislature. The solid line in Figure 2 depicts the optimal committee bias taking into account the endogeneity of the rule choice (b * C ). We see that the switching from closed to open rule generates a rich pattern of optimal committee bias. For very low b L , closed rule is chosen, and the legislature elects a fully captured committee. , and under the optimal rule by the solid line. For lobbyist's bias b L lower than b, the closed rule with a committee perfectly aligned with the lobby is optimal. For b L between b andb, the closed rule with a committee with bias between the lobby and the legislature is optimal. For b L greater thanb the open rule with a committee biased in the opposite direction as the lobby is optimal.
To gain intuition for the above result, first note that the expected payoff of the legislature under closed rule is equal to the loss from the committee's bias plus the information loss from the communication between the lobbyist and the committee:
where l CS : R + → R + is an increasing function with l(0) = 0. 13
For small b L , the loss from biasing the decision by the complete delegation, b 2 L , is second order, but the loss from imperfect information transmission in CS can shown to be of first order in the bias. 14 This implies that under closed rule, for small b L , it is optimal for the legislature to appoint a committee that is fully 13 More specifically, from CS:
where N denotes the size of the partition associated with the most informative equilibrium. 14 From the formula in (1), 1/N 2 = 2b + O(b 2 ), and
where for a function f : aligned with the lobbyist's interests. Moreover, Ivanov (2010) shows that the legislature's loss remains first order in the lobbyist's bias even when an optimally biased intermediary is used. This concludes that for small b L , closed rule is better for the legislature than open rule.
For intermediate values of b L closed rule remains optimal, but the optimal committee choice trades off making somewhat biased decisions to improve information transmission. The optimal committee bias is highly nonmonotonic in this interval (see Figure 2 ).
For large values of b L closed rule yields little or no improvement to the legislature relative to direct communication, as improving information transmission would require appointing a substantially biased committee.
In contrast, the optimal committee under open rule can increase the legislature's payoff significantly for such large levels of committee bias. See Figure 3 for the comparison of losses under the two procedural rules and under direct communication between the lobbyist and the legislature.
To understand how a biased committee can benefit the legislature under open rule, first note that committees serve as intermediaries in the communication between the legislature and the lobbyist. Such intermediation can improve information transmission between the sender and the receiver, even in a pure cheap talk context. The reason is that for certain types of intermediators there can be mixed equilibria in which the intermediary's mixing behavior introduces noise into the communication in a way that induces the sender to transfer more information. Figure 4 illustrates such an equilibrium when b L = 3 10 and the legislature selects a committee with b C = − 2 15 . In this case the lobbyist's bias is so large that the only equilibrium in a direct communication game between the lobbyist and the legislature would be the noninformative equilibrium. In particular, there is no equilibrium with two partition cells, as for any such partition there would be states in the lower cell at which the lobbyist would rather induce the action corresponding to the higher cell than the action corresponding to the lower cell. However, in a game with intermediated communication through a committee with the above bias, there exists a two-cell equilibrium. In this equilibrium the lobbyist partitions the state space into two cells, and sends a message corresponding to the cell that a realized state lies in. The committee sends a "low" proposal after receiving a "low" message from the lobbyist, but mixes between the "low" and "high" proposals after receiving a "high" message from the lobbyist. This behavior raises the action chosen by the legislature following a "low" proposal, as with some probability it is sent in high states as well, making the "low" message more attractive for the upward-biased lobbyist. This eases the incentive constraints of the lobbyist in revealing information, and facilitates the informative equilibrium illustrated in the figure. 15 Figure 4 : Welfare-improving mixed equilibrium with biased committee.
One interpretation of this scenario is that the legislature appoints a negatively biased committee because the latter makes it possible that even after high messages from the lobbyist, the implemented action is the lower action, as the negatively biased committee "offsets" the positively biased lobbyist. But exactly because of this, the lower action implemented in this equilibrium is relatively high, which facilitates more information transmission by the lobbyist.
We also note that, as remarked in AAK, in the spirit of Harsányi (1973) , the above mixed equilibria can be arbitrarily approximated by pure strategy equilibria of games in which there is a small degree of uncertainty regarding the committee's actual bias. 16 In these equilibria the committee almost always strictly prefers one equilibrium proposal to any of the others, and acts deterministically. But from the legislature's perspective, the committee's strategy seems to be random. In a similar way, the mixed equilibria we consider can also be approximated by pure strategy equilibria of games in which the committee also receives a (weak) private signal, besides gathering information by talking to the lobbyist. The intuition is the same: the private signal can tilt a committee close to being indifferent between two equilibrium proposals, to either direction.
Notice that Theorem 1 implies that a committee close to the legislature's preference is consistent with both closed rule (when the lobbyist's bias is sufficiently small) and open rule (when the lobbyist's bias is sufficiently large). Similarly, a substantially biased committee is also consistent with both open and closed rule (when the lobbyist's bias is in an intermediate range). These observations apply, despite the fact that the optimal rule is monotonic in the magnitude of the lobbyist's bias (but the relationship between the optimal rule and the committee bias is nonmonotonic).
Lastly, below is a summary of how we obtained Theorem 1. GK and Dessein (2002) investigate the problem of whether an uninformed principal wants to delegate decision power to an informed but biased agent, or just communicate with the agent and retain the decision power. 17 They show that delegation can benefit the principal (in our case, the legislature), even though it introduces a systematic bias in the policy choice. The intuition is that delegation facilitates more information transmission from the informed party. Dessein (2002) also extends the above analysis to the case when the principal can delegate decision power to an intermediary, which is exactly the continuation game in our model that results under closed rule.
The trade-off for the legislature in this case is clear: appointing a committee with preferences closer to the lobbyist increases information transmission, at the expense of greater bias in the policy choice.
Regarding open rule, as shown in Goltsman et al. (2009) , b L ≥ 1/2 implies that there does not exist any mechanism which induces the lobbyist to transmit information. This in particular implies that no strategic committee could induce information transmission, and irrespective of the choice of committee the legislature's expected loss is 1 12 , corresponding to a babbling equilibrium (choosing ax = 1 2 in every state). For smaller biases, Ivanov (2010) shows that the loss with an optimal intermediary is the same as when using a nonstrategic mediator as in Goltsman et al. (2009) , thereby deriving the maximum ex ante payoff that the legislature can achieve under open rule. In particular, for almost every b L ∈ (0, 1 2 ) there exists a value of b C which facilitates an equilibrium that is strictly better for the legislature than any equilibrium without appointing a committee (equivalently, when appointing a nonbiased committee). Moreover, the maximum ex ante payoff with open rule can be achieved by appointing a committee with bias between −2b L and 0, that is in the opposite direction of the lobbyist's bias (see Figure 2 ).
Theorem 1 combines the above findings. In particular, we show that there is a critical lobbyist bias level b, below which it is optimal for the legislature to use closed rule and above which it is optimal to use open rule. To obtain this critical value, we conjecture that the optimum closed rule equilibrium near the threshold involves N = 2 messages (we verify this in the proof). Given this, it can be shown that the loss with closed rule is 1 
Discussion
Here we discuss two modifications of the model presented above.
Exogenous committee bias
So far the analysis assumed that the legislature can select the optimal committee, given the bias of the relevant lobbyist. This essentially assumes that a separate ad-hoc committee is created to process each bill.
While this is a good approximation of how the legislative process worked in the early years of the United States Congress (see Canon and Stewart (2001) ), efficiency considerations led to a system where standing committees consisting of infrequently changing membership are responsible for proposing most amendments to the legislature.
Our model is still a good approximation of the process if the jurisdiction of standing committees is specified in a way such that all relevant interest groups that a given committee consults have roughly the same bias.
Nevertheless, the prevalence of standing committees in the legislative process makes it important to analyze the case when the committee bias is exogenously given and the legislature can only choose the procedural rule for each bill. The procedural rule can indeed be chosen on a case-by-case basis in the legislature, and the same committee's proposals for different bills can be processed under different procedural rules.
Formally, consider the same timing and payoff structure as in the base model, but now suppose b C is not the choice variable of the legislature but an exogenous parameter determined before stage 0. Hence, the legislature's problem becomes choosing the procedural rule, as a function of b L and b C .
Our first observation is that Theorem 1 implies that if b L >b := 1/ √ 8 then open rule is optimal. This follows because, in this range, choosing closed rule yields a payoff to the legislature that is strictly worse than its payoff in babbling equilibrium, for any b C = 0. Hence, closed rule cannot be optimal if the lobbyist's bias is too large.
Our second observation is that b C > 1/ √ 12 implies that the legislature's loss from the committee's bias under closed rule exceeds the informational loss in the babbling equilibrium. 18 Hence, closed rule cannot be optimal if the committee's bias is too large.
Third, the next result states that closed rule cannot be optimal if the committee is biased in the opposite direction to the lobbyist. First, we observe that whenever the best pure strategy equilibrium under open rule, which is fully characterized in AAK, yields a higher payoff for the legislature than its payoff under closed rule, closed rule is clearly suboptimal. The set of (b L , b C ) pairs where this is the case is depicted in Figure 5 as the area marked with diagonal lines texture, outside the bounded region surrounded by curves OQ, QR, RS, and SO.
We will refer to the remaining set of bias pairs (where closed rule can be better than open rule) as the OQRS region.
Second, both Proposition 5 of AAK and Lemma 4 of Ivanov (2010) imply that below the 45-degree line the best equilibrium under open rule is a pure strategy equilibrium. This implies that, in the OQRS region, closed rule is better than open rule for all the points below the 45-degree line.
Third, the payoff of the legislature under open rule with a given committee bias is bounded from above by −b L (1 − b L )/3, which is shown in Goltsman et al. (2009) to be the maximum payoff of the legislature when using a nonstrategic intermediary to communicate with the lobbyist. Hence, when the latter is smaller than the payoff that can be attained by closed rule, it is surely suboptimal. This consideration establishes that for points enclosed by the dotted curve, closed rule is better than open rule.
Finally, AAK show that there is no mixed equilibrium with two possible actions induced in equilibrium if b C > b L > 0.25. The arguments can be extended to show that there is no nontrivial mixed equilibrium in this region. As this extension is straightforward, we omit it from the current paper. This reasoning implies that at points in the OQRS region that are above the 45-degree line and to the right of the b L = 0.25 line, closed rule is optimal.
The (b L , b C ) pairs for which the above arguments establish the optimality of closed rule are depicted as the shaded region. The small white region surrounded by curves OQ, QP, and PO represents the remaining set of (b L , b C ) pairs, at which the above arguments do not determine whether open or closed rule is better.
To summarize, the analysis reveals similar qualitative findings regarding optimal procedural rules as in the endogenous committee bias case: closed rule is optimal if the lobbyists's bias is not too large, and the committee is biased in the same direction, but not too biased relative to the lobbyist. Mylovanov (2008) shows that in an analogous setting that delegating decision power to the informed player, subject to veto power by the principle, can achieve the same ex ante payoff for the principal as the optimal arbitration rule, provided that the status quo outcome can be selected by the legislature ex ante. 20 Arbitration implies that the principal can ex ante commit to a possibly stochastic policy after any possible message from the informed agent. If such commitment is possible, the principal can do no worse than his optimal payoff in the game we analyzed in Section 3. 21
Endogenously chosen status quo
An important implication of the above result is that with an endogenously selected status quo, closed rule is always (at least weakly) better for the legislature than open rule. This is a stark result, and it does not conform with the empirical observations on legislative decision-making. However, in most cases the assumption that the status quo outcome can be endogenously selected is unrealistic. A procedure like that would involve first working out a proposal that changes the current status quo to a new reference point that the legislature finds optimal ex ante. This would require creating a different (unbiased) committee than the committee that works out the final proposal, increasing the workload of the legislature, and lengthening the legislative process. Nevertheless, we regard the optimality of closed rule under an endogenously-selected status quo as an intriguing theoretical result, with possible implications to future institutional design in legislatures. 22 20 The term "arbitration rule" is introduced in Goltsman et al. (2008) . Other papers in the economics literature refer to it as a constrained delegation schedule without monetary transfers (see for example Holmstrom (1977) , Melumad and Shibano (1991) , Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Kovč and Mylovanov (2009) ). 21 The legislature can potentially achieve an even higher payoff if it makes different proposals differentially costly for the committee, through bureaucratic procedural rules, as in Ambrus and Egorov (2012) . We do not pursue this direction here. 22 An existing institutional channel that can potentially be used in implementing the above optimal arbitration outcome is discharge petitions. Any member of legislature may file such a petition calling for a measure to be brought out of a committee. When half of the House members (218) have signed the petition, the measure is taken from the committee and considered on the legislature. If the legislature can commit to carry out such an action only if the committee proposal is above a cap corresponding to the ex ante optimal status quo, the threat of a discharge petition implements the optimal arbitration scheme. This possibility is consistent with the fact that discharge petitions are often used as a threat, and that in the past three decades there have been increases in both the use of closed rule and in the number of discharge petitions (see Burden (2005) and Theriault (2009)).
Conclusion
The findings of this paper show that the relatively complicated patterns of committee biases and procedural rules observed in legislative decision-making can be explained by a model in the tradition of the informational theories of committees. Namely, if the legislative process requires informational input from outside interest groups, it can be in the legislature's interest to appoint a biased committee to communicate with the expert.
The use of both open and closed rule can be optimal, depending on the interest group's bias, and there is no monotonic relationship between the magnitude of the committee's bias and the chosen procedural rule. A testable new prediction of our model is that closed rule tends to be associated with committees biased in the same direction as the relevant interest groups, while open rule tends to be associated with committees that are either representative of the median legislator, or biased in the opposite direction of the relevant interest groups. We leave an empirical investigation of these issues to future work.
Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we begin by collecting some results from the existing literature.
Conditional on selecting closed rule, the optimal committee choice of the legislature is characterized in Dessein (2002) .
Proposition A1 (Proposition 5 Dessein (2002)) Under closed rule, the legislature always elects a committee with bias b cl C ∈ [0, b L ]. Furthermore,
, the optimal committee is fully aligned with the lobbyist's interests:
the optimal committee has a bias strictly between the legislature's and the lobbyist's: b cl C ∈ (0, b L ).
• If b L >b, the optimal committee is fully aligned with the legislature's interests: b cl C = 0.
In the case of open rule, Ivanov (2010) shows the following result.
Proposition A2 (Ivanov 2010 ) Under open rule, and b L ≤ 1/2, the legislature's minimum loss with an endogenously selected committee is
and it can be attained with a committee with bias b op C ∈ (−2b L , 0].
In addition to these two results, we will need an auxiliary result, Lemma 1, before proving Theorem 1.
Although Proposition A2 characterizes the payoffs attainable under the open rule, the results in Ivanov do not fully characterize the optimal committee bias. Therefore we use Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 1 to characterize the optimal committee bias, in the case where the open rule is optimal. For Lemma 1, we will use some terminology from AAK. In Proposition 4 (and in greater detail in Section 3 of the online supplementary note) of AAK it is shown that any equilibrium can be partitioned in a finite number of components, such that whenever the lobbyist announces a state in a component, the committee mixes only between adjacent actions in that component. We will denote a component with K actions as a K-component.
Lemma 1. If b L >b and K ≥ 4, then there is no equilibrium with a K-component.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the contrary.
Let the boundaries of the interval partition of a component be t 0 , ..., t K , with t k−1 < t k for all k = 1, . . . , K, where t 0 and t K are the endpoints of the component itself. Let the equilibrium actions be x 1 , ..., x K with x k−1 < x k for all k = 2, . . . , K.
First suppose b C > 0. Then we know that b C > b L from Proposition 5 of AAK. After messages k = 1, ..., 3, the committee is indifferent between x k ≤ t k +t k−1 2 and x k+1 . This implies that x k+1 − x k ≥ 2b C for every k = 1, ..., 3 (otherwise the committee would prefer the higher message of the two). Hence, t K − t 0 ≥ 6b C > 1, a contradiction.
Next, suppose b C < 0.
First, note that x 2 − t 1 > b L . This is because at t 1 the lobbyist is indifferent between inducing x 1 and
x 2 > t 1 , which is inconsistent with x 2 − t 1 ≤ b L (in this case he should strictly prefer x 2 to x 1 ). Second, note that x K − t K−1 > b L , otherwise at t K−1 the committee would strictly prefer sending the highest message in the component). Third, note that t K − x K > b L , since x K − t K−1 > b L (as shown in the previous step) and because x K is the midpoint of t K−1 and t K . Fourth, note that t K−1 +t K−2 2 − x K−2 > |b C |, otherwise when receiving the second highest message, the committee would strictly prefer x K−2 to x K−1 , contrary to the assumed equilibrium.
The above arguments establish that
Consider first |b C | ≥ 0.04. Then b L > 0.32 and inequality (3) imply t K − t 0 > 1, a contradiction.
Consider next |b C | < 0.04. This implies x K − x K−1 = 2|b C | < 0.08. Then x K − t K−1 > b L implies that
otherwise when receiving the second highest message, the committee would strictly prefer x K−2 to x K−1 , contrary to the assumed equilibrium. Then inequality (3) leads to a contradiction.
Having collected these results, we can proceed to the proof of Theorem 1. Propositions A1 and A2 are used to derive the boundary between the regions where the open or closed rule is optimal. Proposition A1 then characterizes the optimal committee bias in the closed rule region. In the open rule region, the characterization of the optimal committee bias depends on a more detailed argument based on Lemma 1. First, we prove (i).
In the range b L ∈ (0, 1/4), using closed rule with b C = b L gives a loss of b 2 L , which is strictly less than
the loss with open rule given by equation (2), which is b L (1 − b L )/3.
In the range b L ∈ [1/4,b), using closed rule with b C = b L /2 results in a partition of size N = 2 and a loss
which is also strictly less than b L (1 − b L )/3, where we used equation (1) 
This and the formula for the size of partitions in the CS equilibria given in the text imply that the number of partitions under closed rule equilibrium is N ≤ 3. So we only have to check that, for the three cases N = 1, 2, and 3, there is no b C such that closed rule is weakly better. We omit this straightforward verification.
What remains to show is (ii), i.e. that for b L ∈ (b, 1 2 ) the optimal committee bias is as stated. It is straightforward to check that the committee bias in the proposition yields the minimum loss to the legislature.
Indeed, Ivanov (2010) uses a committee with this bias in the proof of Proposition A2. Therefore, we only have to prove that this optimal committee bias is unique, in the region where the open rule is optimal. The idea of the proof is to show that the optimal equilibrium must have a very specific structure: the lobbyist's partition has two possible messages, and a negatively biased committee only mixes when receiving the higher message. That is, the equilibrium partition is composed of a single 2-component. Then it is easy to explicitly describe equilibrium and calculate the unique optimal bias. The first step in the proof is to show that in the given range, equilibria with any committee cannot have components with four or more actions. This is shown in Lemma 1 above.
Furthermore, in AAK Section 4.2 and online supplementary note Section 2.2 the authors completely characterize equilibria with a single 3-component, and in particular show that if |b L | > 1/10 then there cannot be such equilibria. This result also implies that there cannot be any equilibrium with a 3-component, since the equilibrium play within such a component would correspond to a single 3-component equilibrium with a restricted state space corresponding to the component. Given such a state space, the AAK characterization implies that there cannot be an equilibrium consisting of a single 3-component. This concludes that for any committee, equilibria can at most have 2-components.
Equilibria with 2-components are easy to characterize. Consider a 2-component with endpoints t 0 , t 1 , t 2 .
By the characterization in Section 2.1 of the online supplementary note to AAK, we have that
Also, for b L >b, we have b C ≤ 0. So t 2 − t 1 ≥ 2b > 0.64. In particular, there can be no equilibria with two or more 2-components. Also, if an equilibrium has a 2-component with a 1-component on either the right or the left, the indifference condition of the lobbyist gives that one of these components has to have size at least 4b L > 1. So no equilibria with both 1-components and 2-components exist.
Because CS show that no informative equilibria composed exclusively of 1-components exist, we have that the only possibility for a non-babbling equilibrium consists of a single 2-component. This case is fully characterized in Section 2.1 of the online supplementary note to AAK. In the case b C ≥ 0, a straightforward calculation shows that it is not possible to improve on direct communication. In the case b C < 0, the component is partitioned by the point t 1 = 1 − 2(b L − b C ). Having this characterization of the equilibrium partition, one can simply calculate the loss of using a given committee bias b C . It is given by
where ∆ = b C − b L . This gives the unique value of the optimal bias b C = −(1 − 2b L )/3.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Proposition 2. First, notice that the legislature's payoff under closed rule is worse than the committee's payoff by b 2 C > 0. Hence, it suffices to show that the legislature's payoff under open rule is weakly greater than the committee's payoff under closed rule. To see this, we show that the legislature's payoff in a pure strategy equilibrium under open rule is weakly greater than the committee's payoff under closed rule.
Proposition 2 in AAK implies that a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to constitute a pure strategy equilibrium under open rule is that the lobbyist's and the legislature's strategies correspond to an equilibrium in direct communication between them, and that two adjacent actions that are assigned positive probability have distance at least 2|b C | between them. On the other hand, by the same proposition, a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to constitute an equilibrium under closed rule is that the lobbyist's and the committee's strategies correspond to an equilibrium in direct communication between them, and that two adjacent actions that are assigned positive probability have distance at least 2(b L − b C ) between them. Since 2(b L − b C ) > 2|b C |, the payoff that the committee achieves under closed
